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Abstract. The device-unique response of a physically unclonable func-
tion (PUF) can serve as the root of trust in an embedded cryptographic
system. Fuzzy extractors transform this noisy non-uniformly distributed
secret into a stable high-entropy key. The overall efficiency thereof, typ-
ically depending on error-correction with a binary [n, k, d] block code,
is determined by the universal and well-known (n − k) bound on the
min-entropy loss. We derive new considerably tighter bounds for PUF-
induced distributions that suffer from, e.g., bias or spatial correlations.
The bounds are easy-to-evaluate and apply to large non-trivial codes,
e.g., BCH, Hamming and Reed-Muller codes. Apart from an inherent
reduction in implementation footprint, the newly developed theory also
facilitates the analysis of state-of-the-art error-correction methods for
PUFs. As such, we debunk the reusability claim of the reverse fuzzy
extractor. Moreover, we provide proper quantitative motivation for de-
biasing schemes, as this was missing in the original proposals.
Keywords: fuzzy extractor, secure sketch, min-entropy, physically un-
clonable function, coding theory
1 Introduction
Cryptography relies on reproducible uniformly distributed secret keys. Obtain-
ing affordable physically secure key-storage in embedded non-volatile memory is
? This manuscript is accepted for the CHES 2016 conference. An extended version is
available in the Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/854.
hard though. Harvesting entropy from physically unclonable functions (PUFs)
comprehends an alternative that lowers the vulnerability during the power-off
state. Unfortunately, PUF responses are corrupted by noise and non-uniformities
are bound to occur. A fuzzy extractor [11] provides an information-theoretically
secure mechanism to convert PUF responses into high-quality keys. The essen-
tial building block for handling noisiness is the secure sketch, providing error-
correction with most frequently a binary [n, k, d] block code. Associated public
helper data reveals information about the PUF response though; the system
provider should hence quantify how much min-entropy remains. So far, the con-
servative (n− k) upper bound on the min-entropy loss has been applied. Unfor-
tunately, the residual min-entropy is underestimated, implying that more PUF
response bits than necessary have to be used. Expensive die area is hence blocked
by PUF circuits that are not strictly required to obtain the desired security level,
i.e., symmetric key length.
1.1 Contribution
The novelty of our work is twofold:
– First, we derive new bounds on the secure sketch min-entropy loss for PUF-
induced distributions with practical relevance. Our bounds are considerably
tighter than the well-known (n−k) formula, hereby improving the implemen-
tation efficiency of PUF-based key generators. The discrepancy is showcased
for two predominant PUF imperfections, i.e., biased and spatially correlated
response bits. It is important to note that a variety of commonly used codes
is covered, e.g., BCH and Reed-Muller codes, regardless of their algebraic
complexity. Furthermore, a large variety of distributions could be supported.
Therefore, our scope reaches considerably further than related work in [8,
22], focussing on simple repetition codes and biased distributions only. As in
the latter works, our bounds are easy-to-evaluate and able to support large
codes.
– Second, the newly developed theory is applied to state-of-the-art error-
correction methods for PUFs. As such, we reveal a fundamental flaw in the
reverse fuzzy extractor, proposed by Van Herrewege et al. [28] at Financial
Crypto 2012. The latter lightweight primitive is gaining momentum and has
also been adopted in the CHES 2015 protocol of Aysu et al. [1]. We debunk
the main security claim that repeated helper data exposure does not result
in additional min-entropy loss. Furthermore, we contribute to the motiva-
tion of debiasing schemes such as the index-based syndrome (IBS) proposal
of Yu et al. [30], and the CHES 2015 proposal of Maes et al. [22]. The latter
proposals assume that a stand-alone sketch cannot handle biased distribu-
tions. We eliminate the need for an educated guess that originates from the
extrapolation of repetition code insights and/or the application of the overly
conservative (n− k) bound.
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1.2 Organization
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
notation and preliminaries. Section 3 derives new tight bounds on the secure
sketch min-entropy loss. Section 4 elaborates applications of the newly developed
theory. Section 5 concludes the work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Binary vectors are denoted with a bold lowercase character, e.g., x. All vec-
tors are row vectors. All-zeros and all-ones vectors are denoted with 0 and
1 respectively. Binary matrices are denoted with a bold uppercase character,
e.g., H. A random variable and its corresponding set of outcomes are denoted
with an uppercase italic and calligraphic character respectively, e.g., X and X .
Variable assignment is denoted with an arrow, e.g., x ← X. Custom-defined
procedure names are printed in a sans-serif font, e.g., Hamming weight HW(x)
and Hamming distance HD(x, x˜). The probability of an event A is denoted as
P(A). The expected value of a function g(X) of random variable X is denoted as
Ex←X [g(X)]. The probability density function and cumulative distribution func-
tion of a standard normal distribution N(0, 1) are denoted as fnorm(·) and Fnorm(·)
respectively. For a binomial distribution with n trials and success probability p,
we use fbino(·;n, p) and Fbino(·;n, p) respectively.
2.2 Min-Entropy Definitions
The min-entropy of a random variable X is as defined in (1). Consider now a
pair of possibly correlated random variables: X and P . The conditional min-
entropy [11] of X given P is as defined in (2). Terms with P(P = p) = 0 are
evaluated as 0. Both definitions quantify the probability that an attacker guesses
x← X first time right, on a logarithmic scale. We emphasize that min-entropy is
a more conservative notion than Shannon entropy and therefore often preferred
within cryptology.
H∞(X) = − log2
(
max
x∈X
P(X = x)
)
. (1)
H˜∞(X|P ) = − log2
(
Ep←P
[
max
x∈X
P((X = x)|(P = p))]). (2)
2.3 Physically Unclonable Functions
A prominent category of PUFs, suitable for key generation in particular, con-
sists of an array of identically designed cells. Each cell produces a single bit, or
occasionally a few bits. This includes memory-based designs, such as the SRAM
PUF [16], as well as the coating PUF [25] and a subset of the large number of
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ring oscillator-based designs, e.g., [29]. The most prominent entropy-degrading
effects for such PUFs are bias and spatial correlations. Bias comprehends an
imbalance between the number of zeros and ones. Spatial correlations implicate
that neighboring cells might influence each other.
We describe a parameterized probability distribution for the error rate of
individual PUF response bits x˜(i), with i ∈ [1, n]. Experimental validation on
various PUF circuits, e.g., in [20, 10], labelled the model as accurate. Two hidden
random variables are incorporated: the normalized manufacturing variability
Vi ∼ N(0, 1), drawn only once for each response bit, and additive noise Nij ∼
N(0, σN ), drawn for each evaluation j of a given response bit. A response bit x˜(i)
evaluates to 1 if (vi+nij) > t and 0 otherwise, with threshold t a fixed parameter.
Bias corresponds to a nonzero t. Spatial correlations can be incorporated via a
multivariate normal distribution
(
V1 . . . Vn
) ∼ N(0,Σ), with Σ the symmetric
n× n covariance matrix.
For ease of analysis, we consider the response bits x(i) obtained by threshold-
ing vi > t as a reference. In practice, these nominal values can be approximated
via a majority vote among noisy replicas x˜(i), possibly accelerated via circuit
techniques [4, 30]. Bias parameter b, defined as the probability P(x(i) = 1), then
equals Fnorm(−t). Zero bias corresponds to b = 0.5. The error rate pE of a re-
sponse bit x˜(i) with respect to its reference, i.e., the probability P(x(i) 6= x˜(i)),
then equals Fnorm(−|vi − t|/σN ).
2.4 Secure Sketch and Fuzzy Extractor Definitions
Secure sketches operate on a metric space X with distance function dist. For
PUFs, we can restrict our attention to binary vectors x ∈ {0, 1}1×n and the
Hamming distance HD therebetween. An attacker knows the probability distri-
bution of x ← X. Consider a noisy version x˜ of sample x. A secure sketch [11]
is a pair of efficient and possibly randomized procedures: the sketching pro-
cedure p ← SSGen(x), with helper data p ∈ P, and the recovery procedure
x̂← SSRep(x˜,p). There are two defining properties:
– Correctness. If HD(x, x˜) ≤ t, correctness of reconstruction is guaranteed,
i.e., x̂ = x. If HD(x, x˜) > t, there is no guarantee whatsoever.
– Security. Given a certain lower bound hin on the ingoing min-entropy, i.e.,
H∞(X) ≥ hin, a corresponding lower bound hout on the residual min-entropy,
i.e., H˜∞(X|P ) ≥ hout, can be imposed. Often, but not necessarily, this condi-
tion can be satisfied regardless of hin. Or stated otherwise, there is a certain
upper bound on the min-entropy loss ∆H∞ = H∞(X)− H˜∞(X|P ).
A slightly modified notion brings us to the fuzzy extractor [11]. Output k ∈ K
is then required to be nearly-uniform, given observation p← P , and is therefore
suitable as a secret key. There is a proven standard method to craft a fuzzy ex-
tractor from a secure sketch. In particular, a randomness extractor could derive
a key from the secure sketch output, i.e., k ← Ext(x). Universal hash func-
tions [7] are good randomness extractors, according to the (generalized) leftover
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hash lemma [13, 2]. Unfortunately, their min-entropy loss is quite substantial. In
practice, key generators therefore often rely on a cryptographic hash function
that is assumed to behave as a random oracle. The latter idealized heuristic
results in zero min-entropy loss.
2.5 Coding Theory
A binary code C is a bijection from a message space M to a codeword space
W ⊆ {0, 1}1×n. The minimum distance d is the minimum number of bits in
which any two distinct codewords differ. A procedure w ← Encode(m) maps a
message m ∈ M to a codeword w ∈ W. A procedure ŵ ← Correct(w˜) corrects
up to t = bd−12 c errors for any noise-corrupted codeword w˜ = w ⊕ e, with
HW(e) ≤ t. Equation (3) expresses the Hamming bound [18]. The equality holds
for perfect codes only, implicating that any vector in {0, 1}1×n is within distance
t of a codeword. All other codes are subject to the inequality.
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
|M| ≤ 2n. (3)
A binary [n, k, d] block code C restricts the message length k = log2(|M|) to
an integer. For a linear block code, any linear combination of codewords is again
a codeword. A k × n generator matrix G, having full rank, can then implement
the encoding procedure, i.e., w = m ·G. For any translation τ ∈ {0, 1}1×n and
linear code C, the set {τ ⊕w : w ∈ W} is referred to as a coset. Two cosets are
either disjoint or coincide. Therefore, the vector space {0, 1}1×n is fully covered
by 2n−k cosets, referred to as the standard array. The minimum weight vector 
in a coset is called the coset leader. In case of conflict, i.e., a common minimum
HW() > t, an arbitrary leader can be selected. The minimum distance d of a
linear code equals the minimum Hamming weight of its nonzero codewords. A
linear code C is cyclic if every circular shift of a codeword is again a codeword
belonging to C.
2.6 The Code-Offset Secure Sketch
Several secure sketch constructions rely on a binary code C. For ease of under-
standing, we focus on the code-offset method of Dodis et al. [11] exclusively.
Nevertheless, equivalencies in the extended version of this manuscript (Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive, Report 2015/854) prove that all results apply to six other
constructions equally well. The code C that instantiates the code-offset method
in Fig. 1 is not necessarily linear. Even more, it is not required be a block code ei-
ther. Linear codes (BCH, Hamming, repetition, etc.) remain the most frequently
used though due to their efficient decoding algorithms [18]. Correctness of re-
construction is guaranteed if HD(x, x˜) ≤ t, with t the error-correcting capability
of the code.
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p← SSGen(x) x̂← SSRep(x˜,p)
Random w ∈ C
p← x⊕w
w˜ ← x˜⊕ p = w ⊕ e
x̂← p⊕ Correct(w˜)
Fig. 1. The code-offset secure sketch, having an n-bit reference input x.
Min-entropy loss can be understood as a one-time pad imperfection. Sketch
input x is masked with a random codeword w, i.e., an inherent entropy defi-
ciency: H∞(W ) = log2(|M|) < n. For linear codes in particular, we highlight
a convenient interpretation using cosets. Helper data p then reveals in which
coset reference x resides. It can be seen easily that p is equal to a random
vector in the same coset as x. The residual min-entropy in (2) hence reduces
to (4) for linear codes, with  a coset leader. We emphasize that the min-entropy
loss ∆H∞ does not depend on the decoding method, simply because the helper
data is not affected. For [n, k, d] block codes in particular, the well-known upper
bound ∆H∞ ≤ (n− k) holds, as proven in [11]. More generally, this extends to
∆H∞ ≤ n− log2(|M|).
H˜∞(X|P ) = − log2
(
E←E
[
max
w∈W
P((X = ⊕w)|(E = ))]). (4)
3 Tight Bounds on the Min-Entropy Loss
Currently, secure sketch implementations rely on the (n−k) upper bound on the
min-entropy loss, e.g., [23]. Unfortunately, this leads to an overly conservative
design when instantiating security parameters accordingly. We develop a graphi-
cal framework that produces tight bounds on H˜∞(X|P ) for typical PUF-induced
distributions. The critical first-order effects of bias and spatial correlations are
captured. Both lower and upper bounds are supported. The lower bounds are of
primary interest for a conservative system provider, entertaining the worst-case
scenario. We considerably improve upon the (n − k) bound, i.e., the leftmost
inequality in (5). We also improve upon the rather trivial upper bounds [11]
that comprehend the rightmost inequality in (5).
max(H∞(X)− (n− log2(|M|)), 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
worst-case
≤ H˜∞(X|P ) ≤ min(log2(|M|),H∞(X))︸ ︷︷ ︸
best-case
.
(5)
Our lower and upper bounds combined define a relatively narrow interval in
which the exact value of H˜∞(X|P ) is enclosed. We considerably extend related
work in [8, 22] as follows. First, we cover a variety of codes, regardless of their
algebraic complexity. Prior work focussed on repetition codes only. Although
frequently used as the inner code of a concatenated code [5], full-fledged key
generators [23] typically rely on non-trivial codes, e.g., BCH codes [18]. Second,
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our techniques may be applied to a variety of distributions, while prior work
covered biased distributions only. Our bounds remain easy-to-evaluate and are
able to handle large codes. Although derived for the code-offset sketch of Dodis
et al. [11] in particular, the extended version of this manuscript establishes the
equivalence with six other constructions.
3.1 Distributions
Our work is generic in the sense that a large variety of distributions X could
be covered. We only require that X = {0, 1}1×n can be partitioned in a limited
number of subsets ϕj , with j ∈ [1, J ], so that all elements of ϕj have the same
probability of occurrence qj . Formally, P(X = x) = qj if and only if x ∈ ϕj .
These probabilities are strictly monotonically decreasing, i.e., q1 > q2 > . . . > qJ .
Occasionally, qJ = 0. The ingoing min-entropy is easily computed as H∞(X) =
− log2(q1).
We determine bounds on H˜∞(X|P ). The runtime of the corresponding algo-
rithms is roughly proportional to J . The crucial observation is that even a very
small J might suffice to capture realistic PUF models. Below, we describe a pa-
rameterized distribution X for both biased and spatially correlated PUFs. Both
distributions are to be considered as proof-of-concept models, used in showcasing
the feasibility of a new research direction. In case a given PUF is not approx-
imated accurately enough, one can opt for an alternative and possibly more
complicated second-order distribution. As long as J is limited, bounds can be
evaluated in milliseconds-minutes on a standard desktop computer.
– Biased distribution. We assume response bits to be independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) so that P(X(i) = 1) = b, with i ∈ [1, n] and a
real-valued b ∈ [0, 1]. For b = 12 , this corresponds to a uniform distribution.
The latter bias model comprehends a very popular abstraction in PUF liter-
ature. The min-entropy loss of various other helper data methods has been
analyzed as such, e.g., soft-decision decoding [21, 8] as well as IBS [30, 15]
and von Neumann [22, 27] debiasing. Therefore, our results enable adequate
comparison with related methods, all using a common baseline distribution.
– Correlated distribution. We assume response bits to be distributed so that
P(X(i) = X(i+1)) = c, with i ∈ [1, n−1] and a real-valued c ∈ [0, 1]. This ex-
tends to (6) for larger neighborhoods. There is no bias, i.e., P(X(i) = 1) = 12 .
For c = 12 , the latter model corresponds to a uniform distribution. Although
spatial correlations are frequently encountered in experimental work, e.g.,
byte-level dependencies for the SRAM PUFs in [14, 1], these are often ne-
glected in information theoretic work due to their complexity. We hope that
our results may help turn the tide on this.
P(X(i) = X(j)) =
b|i−j|/2c∑
u=0
fbino(2u; |i− j|, 1− c), with i, j ∈ [1, n]. (6)
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Fig. 2 specifies the subsets ϕj for both distributions. For the biased dis-
tribution, we partition according to HW(x). This corresponds to a binomial
distribution with j−1 successes for n Bernoulli trials, each having success prob-
ability b? = min(b, 1 − b). For the correlated distribution, we partition accord-
ing to HD(x(1 : n − 1),x(2 : n)), i.e., the number of transitions in x. Inputs
in subset ϕj exhibit j − 1 transitions and obey either one out of two forms,
i.e., x = (0‖1‖0‖ . . .) and x = (1‖0‖1‖ . . .). A related observation is that if
x ∈ ϕj , then so is its ones’ complement, i.e., x ∈ ϕj . This explains the fac-
tors 2 and 12 everywhere. Set size |ϕj | is further determined with stars and bars
combinatorics [12]. In particular, we separate n indistinguishable stars into j
distinguishable bins by adding j − 1 out of n− 1 bars.
j
1
2
. . .
j
. . .
n
n + 1
|ϕj |
1
n
. . .(
n
j−1
)
. . .
n
1
qj
(1− b?)n
b?(1− b?)n−1
. . .
(b?)
j−1(1− b?)n−j+1
. . .
(b?)
n−1(1− b?)
(b?)
n
j
1
2
. . .
j
. . .
n− 1
n
|ϕj |
2
2(n− 1)
. . .
2
(
n−1
j−1
)
. . .
2(n− 1)
2
qj
1
2
(1− c?)n−1
1
2
c?(1− c?)n−2
. . .
1
2
(c?)
j−1(1− c?)n−j
. . .
1
2
(c?)
n−2(1− c?)
1
2
(c?)
n−1
Fig. 2. Subsets ϕj for a biased and correlated distribution X, left and right respectively.
We define b? = min(b, 1− b) and c? = min(c, 1− c).
We treat the degenerate case b = c = 12 , i.e., a uniform distribution, sepa-
rately. There is only one set then. Formally, J = 1, |ϕ1| = 2n and q1 = 1/2n. As
proven by Reyzin [24], the min-entropy loss of a secure sketch is maximal for a
uniformly distributed input, making this a case of special interest.
3.2 Generic Bounds
Equation (7) holds for the code-offset construction of Dodis et al. [11], given
that a codeword is selected fully at random during enrollment.
P((P = p)|(X = x)) =
{
1/|M|, if ∃w : p = x⊕w
0, otherwise.
(7)
Equation (8) applies Bayes’ rule to the definition of conditional min-entropy
in (2) and fills in (7). The 0 case is resolved by switching variables for the max
operator. A direct exhaustive evaluation of the resulting formula requires up to
2n|M| operations.
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H˜∞(X|P ) = − log2
(∑
p∈P

P(P = p) max
x∈X
P(X = x)P((P = p)|(X = x))

P(P = p)
)
= − log2
(
1
|M|
∑
p∈P
max
w∈W
P(X = p⊕w)
)
.
(8)
For linear codes, the workload can be reduced substantially. With a similar
derivation as before, we rewrite (4) as shown in (9). Up to 2n operations suffice.
Nevertheless, direct evaluation is only feasible for small codes. We emphasize
that our bounds are able to handle large codes, as is typically the case for a
practical key generator.
H˜∞(X|P ) = − log2
(∑
∈E
max
w∈W
P(X = ⊕w)
)
. (9)
Equation (8) iterates over all p’s and selects each time the most likely x that
is within range, via the addition of a codeword w ∈ W. We now reverse the
roles, as shown in Fig. 3. We iterate over all x’s, from most likely to least likely,
i.e., from ϕ1 to ϕJ . Within a certain ϕj , the order of the x’s may be chosen
arbitrarily. Subsequently, we assign p’s to each x, as represented by the black
squares, until the set P of size 2n is depleted. For each assigned p, we assume
that the corresponding x is the most likely vector, according to (8). Let spj denote
the number of black squares assigned to set ϕj . The residual min-entropy is then
easily computed as in (10).
H˜∞(X|P ) = − log2
(
1
|M|
J∑
j=1
spj qj
)
. (10)
Both linear and non-linear codes are supported by former graphical repre-
sentation. Nevertheless, we elaborate linear codes as a special case due to their
practical relevance. Fig. 4 swaps the order of iteration in (9). Only one row suf-
fices, i.e., each column of helper data vectors p in Figure 3 is condensed to a
single square. Black and white squares are now assigned to cosets, as represented
by their coset leaders . Let sj denote the number of black squares assigned to
set ϕj . The residual min-entropy is then easily computed as in (11), hereby
dropping denominator |M| compared to (10), given that spj = 2k · sj .
H˜∞(X|P ) = − log2
( J∑
j=1
sjqj
)
. (11)
In the worst-case scenario, the most likely x’s all map to unique p’s, without
overlap, resulting in a lower bound on H˜∞(X|P ). For a linear code, this would
be the case if the first 2n−k x’s all belong to different cosets. In the best-case
scenario, our sequence of x’s exhibits maximum overlap in terms of p, resulting
in an upper bound on H˜∞(X|P ). For a linear code, this would be the case if
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|ϕ1| |ϕj−1| |ϕj | |ϕj+1| |ϕJ |
x
⊕w
p
|M|
mod(2n, |M|)
b2n/|M|c(a)
p
|M|
mod(2n, |M|)
|M| |M| mod(2n, |M|)(b)
Fig. 3. Reversal of the roles in (8). (a) A lower bound on H˜∞(X|P ). (b) An upper
bound on H˜∞(X|P ). Black squares represent terms that contribute to H˜∞(X|P ), one
for each p ∈ P. White squares represent non-contributing terms, overruled by the max
operator. In general, there are few black squares but many white squares, 2n versus
(|M| − 1)2n to be precise. For block codes, i.e., |M| = 2k, the last column of black
squares is completely filled.
|ϕ1| |ϕj−1| |ϕj | |ϕj+1| |ϕJ |
x
⊕w

2n−k(a)

2k 2k 2k(b)
Fig. 4. Reversal of the roles in (9), as applied to linear codes. (a) A lower bound
on H˜∞(X|P ). (b) An upper bound on H˜∞(X|P ). Black squares represent terms that
contribute to H˜∞(X|P ), one for each  ∈ E . White squares represent non-contributing
terms, overruled by the max operator.
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the first 2k x’s all map to the same coset, and this repeated for all 2n−k cosets.
Algorithms 1 and 2 comprehend a literal transcript of Fig. 3 and compute the
lower bound and upper bound respectively. Auxiliary variables sp and sx accu-
mulate black and gray squares respectively. To maintain generality, we abstain
from special case algorithms for linear codes, although it would result in a few
simplifications.
Algorithm 1: BoundWorstCase
Input: List 〈|ϕj |, qj〉
Output: Lower bound on H˜∞(X|P )
j, q, sp ← 0
while sp < 2n do
j ← j + 1
spj ← min(|ϕj ||M|, 2n − sp)
sp ← sp + spj
q ← q + spj · qj
H˜∞(X|P )← − log2(q/|M|)
Algorithm 2: BoundBestCase
Input: List 〈|ϕj |, qj〉
Output: Upper bound on
H˜∞(X|P )
j, q, sp, sx ← 0
while sp < 2n do
j ← j + 1
sx ← sx + |ϕj |
spj ← d(sx − sp)/|M|e|M|
spj ← min(max(spj , 0), 2n − sp)
sp ← sp + spj
q ← q + spj · qj
H˜∞(X|P )← − log2(q/|M|)
Algorithms 1 and 2 may now be applied to a variety of distributions. For a
uniform distribution, the lower and upper bound both evaluate to H˜∞(X|P ) =
log2(|M|), regardless of other code specifics. Or simply k, for block codes in
particular. The min-entropy loss is hence exactly (n−k), given that H∞(X) = n.
Reyzin’s proof [24] therefore implicates that the general-purpose (n− k) bound
cannot be tightened any further. Although results are fairly presentable already
for the biased and correlated distributions, we further tighten these bounds first.
3.3 Tighter Bounds
Tighter bounds can be obtained by leveraging code properties more effectively.
Algorithms 3 and 4 generalize Algorithms 1 and 2 respectively. In the former
case, an additional input imposes an upper bound on the accumulated number
of black squares, i.e., ∀j, (sp1 + sp2 + . . .+ spj ) ≤ (up1 +up2 + . . .+upj ). In the latter
case, an additional input imposes a lower bound on the accumulated number of
black squares, i.e., ∀j, (sp1 + sp2 + . . .+ spj ) ≥ (lp1 + lp2 + . . .+ lpj ). We now provide
several examples.
Worst-Case Bounds We further tighten the lower bound on H˜∞(X|P ) for the
correlated distribution. The improvement applies to linear codes that have the
all-ones vector 1 of length n as a codeword. This includes Reed-Muller codes of
any order [18]. This also includes many BCH, Hamming and repetition codes, on
11
Algorithm 3: BoundWorstCase2
Input: List 〈|ϕj |, qj , upj 〉
Output: Lower bound on H˜∞(X|P )
j, q, sp, up ← 0
while sp < 2n do
j ← j + 1
up ← up + upj
spj ← min(|ϕj ||M|, up − sp)
spj ← min(spj , 2n − sp)
sp ← sp + spj
q ← q + spj · qj
H˜∞(X|P )← − log2(q/|M|)
Algorithm 4: BoundBestCase2
Input: List 〈|ϕj |, qj , lpj 〉
Output: Upper bound on
H˜∞(X|P )
j, q, sp, sx, lp ← 0
while sp1:j < 2
n do
j ← j + 1
sx ← sx + |ϕj |
lp ← lp + lpj
spj ← d(sx − sp)/|M|e|M|
spj ← max(spj , lp − sp, 0)
spj ← min(spj , 2n − sp)
sp ← sp + spj
q ← q + spj · qj
H˜∞(X|P )← − log2(q/|M|)
the condition that these are cyclic and having d odd, as easily proven hereafter.
Consider an arbitrary codeword with Hamming weight d. XORing all 2n circular
shifts of this codeword results in the all-ones codeword, which ends the proof. As
mentioned before, each set ϕj of the correlated distribution can be partitioned in
pairs {x,x}, with x the ones’ complement of x. Paired inputs belong to the same
coset, i.e., maximum overlap in terms of helper data p. Therefore, we impose
the cumulative upper bound in (12).
upj = |M|
|ϕj |
2
= 2k−1|ϕj |. (12)
For instance, consider linear/cyclic [n, k = 1, d = n] repetition codes, i.e.,
having generator matrix G = 1, with n odd. Algorithms BoundWorstCase2 and
BoundBestCase then converge to the exact result H˜∞(X|P ) = 1, not depend-
ing on parameter c. This is the best-case scenario, given the universal bound
H˜∞(X|P ) ≤ k. Fig. 5 illustrates the former with squares for n = 5. The re-
sult also holds if the repetition code is neither linear/cyclic nor odd. As long as
w1 ⊕w2 = 1, the elements of each ϕj can be paired into cosets. Although the
term coset is usually preserved for linear codes, translations of a non-linear repe-
tition code are either disjunct or coincide and still partition the space {0, 1}1×n.
As a side note, the result offers another [8] refutation of the repetition code pitfall
of Koeberl et al. [17], a work that overlooks that (n−k) is an upper bound only.
Best-Case Bounds We improve the upper bound on H˜∞(X|P ) for both the
biased and correlated distribution. In particular, we take minimum distance d
into account. The main insight is that two slightly differing inputs xu 6= xv do
not overlap in terms of helper data p. More precisely, if HD(xu,xv) ∈ [1, d− 1],
then {xu ⊕w | w ∈ W} ∩ {xv ⊕w | w ∈ W} = ∅. For the biased distribution,
12
2 8 12 8 2
x
⊕w
p
Fig. 5. The exact residual min-entropy H˜∞(X|P ) for the correlated distribution and
an [n = 5, k = 1, d = 5] repetition code.
the following holds: HD(xu,xv) ∈ [1, d− 1] if xu 6= xv and xu,xv ∈ (ϕ1 ∪ ϕ2 ∪
. . . ∪ ϕt+1). Or stated otherwise, the elements of the first t+ 1 sets all result in
unique p’s. Therefore, we can impose the constraint given in (13). Fig. 6 depicts
the squares.
lpj =
{
|ϕj ||M|, if j ∈ [1, t+ 1]
0, otherwise
. (13)
|ϕt+1| |ϕt+2| |ϕJ |
x
⊕w
p
|M|
mod(2n, |M|)
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
) t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(|M| − 1) |M| mod(2
n, |M|)
Fig. 6. A tightened upper bound on H˜∞(X|P ) for the biased distribution, hereby
making use of (13).
There is an interesting observation for perfect codes in particular. As clear
from the Hamming bound in (3), all unique p’s are covered by the first t + 1
sets exclusively. BoundWorstCase and BoundBestCase2 hence produce the same
output, implying that the residual min-entropy is evaluated exactly, as further
simplified in (14). Delvaux et al. [8] derived the same formula for [n, k = 1, d = n]
repetition codes with n odd. The scope of their result is hence extended from
perfect repetition codes to perfect codes in general. As a side note, the formula
was originally adopted to debunk the aforementioned repetition code pitfall [17].
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Maes et al. [22] later presented a similar contribution at CHES 2015, differing
in its use of Shannon entropy rather than min-entropy.
H˜∞(X|P ) = − log2
(t+1∑
j=1
|ϕj | · qj
)
= − log2(Fbino(t;n,min(b, 1− b))). (14)
Also for the correlated distribution, distance d might be incorporated to
tighten the upper bound on H˜∞(X|P ). First of all, we assign |M| unique p’s
to one out of two elements in ϕ1. For ease of understanding, assume x = 0,
comprehending the first case in (15). For each set ϕj , with j ∈ [2, n], we then
count the number of inputs x ∈ ϕj such that h = HW(x) ≤ t. The latter
constraint guarantees all assigned p’s to be unique. We distinguish between two
forms, x = (0‖1‖0‖ . . .) and x = (1‖0‖1‖ . . .), resulting in two main terms. For
each form, we apply stars and bars combinatorics twice. In particular, we assign h
indistinguishable stars, i.e., ones, to distinguishable bins and independently also
for n− h zeros. Note that lpj = 0 for j > 2t+ 1. To ensure formula correctness,
one may verify numerically that lp1 + l
p
2 + . . .+ l
p
2t+1 equals the left hand side of
the Hamming bound in (3).
lpj =

|M|, if j = 1
|M|
(∑t
h=bj/2c
(
h−1
bj/2c−1
)(
n−h−1
dj/2e−1
)
+
∑t
h=dj/2e
(
h−1
dj/2e−1
)(
n−h−1
bj/2c−1
))
, otherwise.
(15)
3.4 Numerical Results
Fig. 7 presents numerical results for various BCH codes. We focus on small
codes, as these allow for an exact exhaustive evaluation of the residual min-
entropy using (8) and/or (9). As such, the tightness of various bounds can be
assessed adequately. Fig. 7(d) nevertheless demonstrates that our algorithms
support large codes equally well, in compliance with a practical key generator.
Note that only half of the bias interval b ∈ [0, 1] is depicted. The reason is that
all curves mirror around the vertical axis of symmetry b = 12 . The same holds
for the correlated distribution with parameter c.
Especially the lower bounds perform well, which benefits a conservative sys-
tem provider. The best lower bounds in Figs. 7(a), (b) and (c) visually coin-
cide with the exact result. The gap with the (n − k) bound is the most com-
pelling around b, c ≈ 0.7, where the corresponding curves hit the horizontal axis
H˜∞(X|P ) = 0. Also our upper bounds are considerably tighter than their more
general alternatives in (5). Nevertheless, the latter bounds remain open for fur-
ther improvement, with the exception of Fig. 7(b). An [n = 7, k = 4, d = 3] code
is perfect and lower and upper bounds then converge to the exact result for a
biased distribution.
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Fig. 7. The secure sketch min-entropy loss for various BCH codes. Dots correspond
to an exact exhaustive evaluation of (8)/(9). The legend of the curves is as fol-
lows. (I) The ingoing min-entropy H∞(X) = − log2(q1). (II) The lower bound
H˜∞(X|P ) = max(H∞(X)− (n− k), 0). (III) The lower bound on H˜∞(X|P ) according
to BoundWorstCase. (IV) The upper bound on H˜∞(X|P ) according to BoundBestCase.
(V) The lower bound on H˜∞(X|P ) according to BoundWorstCase2. (VI) The upper
bound on H˜∞(X|P ) according to BoundBestCase2.
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4 Applications
The newly developed theory of Section 3 facilitates the design and analysis of
error-correction methods for PUFs, as exemplified in twofold manner. First, we
point out a fundamental security flaw in the reverse fuzzy extractor [28]. Second,
we provide a motivational framework for debiasing schemes [30, 15, 26, 27, 22].
4.1 A Fundamental Security Flaw in Reverse Fuzzy Extractors
The reverse fuzzy extractor, as proposed by Van Herrewege et al. [28] at Financial
Crypto 2012, improves the lightweight perspectives of PUF-based authentication
protocols. The construction was therefore also adopted in the CHES 2015 proto-
col of Aysu et al. [1]. Instead of a single helper data exposure only, p← SSGen(x˜)
is regenerated and transferred with each protocol run by a resource-constrained
PUF-enabled device. A receiving resource-rich server, storing reference response
x, can hence reconstruct x˜← SSRec(x,p) and establish a shared secret as such.
The footprint of the device is reduced due to the absence of the heavyweight
SSRec procedure.
We debunk the main security claim that repeated helper data exposure
does not result in additional min-entropy loss. The revealed flaw is attributed
to the misuse of a reusability proof of Boyen [6]. For the code-offset sketch
with linear codes, the exposure of p1 ← SSGen(x) and p2 ← SSGen(x ⊕ e),
with perturbation e known and fully determined by the attacker, is provably
equivalent. The latter helper data reveals that x belongs to an identical coset
{p1 ⊕ w : w ∈ W} = {p2 ⊕ e ⊕ w : w ∈ W}. However, perturbation e is
determined by PUF noisiness rather than by the attacker and its release hence
reveals new information. Given a sequence of protocol runs, the attacker can ap-
proximate all individual bit error rates pE as well as the coset to which reference
x belongs.
Fig. 8 quantifies the residual min-entropy of X with the exclusion and in-
clusion of revealed bit error rates pE respectively. In the latter case, we rely on
a Monte Carlo evaluation of (16), as enabled by choosing a small [n = 15, k =
7, d = 5] BCH code, given that an analytical approach is not so very straightfor-
ward. Exposure of pE boils down to knowledge of threshold discrepancy |v(i)−t|.
For the biased distribution, the situation is identical to the flaw in the soft-
decision decoding scheme of Maes et al. [21]. As pointed out by Delvaux of
al. [8], there is a bit-specific bias bi = P(r(i) = 1) = fnorm(t+ |v(i)− t|)/(fnorm(t+
|v(i) − t|) + fnorm(t − |v(i) − t|)). For each x in the coset corresponding to p,
we then compute P(X = x) =
∏n
i=1(x(i)bi + (1 − x(i))(1 − bi)). Similarly, for
the spatially correlated distribution, we compute P(X = x) = fnorm(v,0,Σ),
with covariance matrix Σ exclusively depending on correlation parameter c, as
detailed in the extended version of this manuscript.
H˜∞(X|P ) = − log2
(
Ev←V max
w∈W
P(V = t+ (1− 2w)|v − t| | |v − t|
)
. (16)
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Fig. 8. The residual min-entropy H˜∞(X|P ) for a BCH code. The solid lines that ex-
clude revealed bit error rates are computed with BoundWorstCase2; Fig. 7 confirms
the visual overlap with the exact result. Dots that include revealed bit error rates
correspond to Monte Carlo evaluations of size 106.
The revealed flaw differs from existing attacks by Delvaux et al. [9] and
Becker [3] that apply to the original protocol [28] exclusively. The latter at-
tacks comprehend the modeling of the highly correlated arbiter PUF via re-
peated helper data exposure; a preemptive fix can be found in the PhD thesis of
Maes [19]. The newly revealed flaw is more fundamentally linked to the reverse
fuzzy extractor primitive and applies to all existing protocols so far [28, 19, 1].
Observe in Fig. 8 that the overly conservative (n−k) bound would compensate for
the additional unanticipated min-entropy loss. However, this somewhat defeats
the purpose in light of the original lightweight intentions, and this observation
might not necessarily hold for every possible distribution. Further theoretical
work may determine to which extent and at which cost reverse fuzzy extrac-
tors can be repaired. A potential fix already exists for biased distributions, as
illustrated later-on.
4.2 Motivation for Debiasing Schemes
Debiasing schemes transform a biased PUF-induced distribution into a uniform
distribution. A considerable fraction of the response bits is discarded in order to
restore the balance between 0 and 1. Indices of retained bits are stored as helper
data. A subsequent secure sketch, known to have an exact min-entropy loss of
(n−k) bits for uniform inputs, still corrects the errors. A first debiasing proposal
is the index-based syndrome (IBS) scheme of Yu et al. [30], further generalized
by Hiller et al. [15]. Second, several variations of the von Neumann debiasing
algorithm can be applied. This was first proposed by van der Leest et al. [26],
and later also by Van Herrewege in his PhD thesis [27]. Most recently, Maes et
al. [22] presented an optimization of the von Neumann algorithm that applies to
repetition codes in particular.
Prior debiasing proposals conjectured that a stand-alone sketch cannot han-
dle biased distributions well. This conclusion originates from the extrapolation
of repetition code insights and/or application of the (n− k) bound. The precise
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entropy loss behavior for larger codes, e.g., a BCH [n = 127, k = 64, d = 21] code
as in Fig. 7, was an educated guess so far. Our newly derived bounds clearly re-
solve this motivational uncertainty, in addition to making stand-alone sketches
more competitive. For low-bias situations, the (n− k) bound already resulted in
a competitive sketch [22]; the new bounds can only improve hereupon. We em-
phasize that modern high-quality PUFs tend to have a low bias. Notable cases of
a high bias can typically be attributed to an avoidable asymmetry in the circuit.
Nevertheless, for high-bias situations, the new bounds clearly indicate the need
of debiasing schemes. The benefit is amplified by choosing a sketch with a k-bit
output, several of which are listed in the extended version of this manuscript.
The uniform output is then directly usable as a key, hereby eliminating the Hash
function and its additional min-entropy loss in case the leftover hash lemma is
applied.
Finally, we highlight that one of the von Neumann debiasing schemes in [22]
was claimed to be reusable. This claim holds, despite overlooking the misuse of
Boyen’s proof and stating that a stand-alone sketch is reusable. A side effect of
retaining pairs of alternating bits only, i.e., 01 and 10, is that the imbalance in
error rates between 0 and 1 cannot be observed in the helper data. The scheme
is considerably less efficient than other von Neumann variants though, showing
that reusability comes at a price.
5 Conclusion
Secure sketches are the main workhorse of modern PUF-based key generators.
The min-entropy loss of most sketches is upper-bounded by (n− k) bits and de-
signers typically instantiate system parameters accordingly. However, the latter
bound tends to be overly pessimistic, resulting in an unfortunate implemen-
tation overhead. We showcased the proportions for a prominent category of
PUFs, with bias and spatial correlations acting as the main non-uniformities.
New considerably tighter bounds were derived, valid for a variety of popular
but algebraically complex codes. These bounds are unified in the sense of being
applicable to seven secure sketch constructions. Deriving tighter alternatives for
the (n − k) bound counts as unexplored territory and we established the first
significant stepping stone. New techniques may have to be developed in order to
tackle more advanced second-order distributions. Elaborating a wider range of
applications would be another area of progress. We hope to have showcased the
potential by debunking the main security claim of the reverse fuzzy extractor
and by providing proper quantitative motivation for debiasing schemes.
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